I. characterize tractable cases in which the system as respondent (R) can anticipate the possibility of the user/questioner (Q) drawing false conclusions from its response and can hence alter or expand its response so as to prevent it happening; 2. develop a formal method for computing the projected inferences that Q may draw from a particular response, identifying those 1This work is partially supported by NSF Grants MCS 100. 2At present visiting the Department of Computer and Information Science, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104.
factors whose presence or absence catalyzes the inferences; 3. enable the system to generate modifications of its response that can defuse possible false inferences and that [nay provide additional useful information as well.
Before we begin, it is important to see how this work differs from our related work on responding when the system notices a discrepancy between its beliefs and those of its user [7, 8, 9, 18] . For example, if a user asks • How many French students failed CSEI21 last term?', he shows that he .believes inter alia that the set of French students is non-empty, that there is a course CSEI21, and that it, was given last term. If the system simply answers "None', he will assume the system concurs w'ith these b~diefs since the answer is consistent with them. Furthermore, he may conclude that French students do r;'d.her well in a difficult course. But this may be a false conclusion if the system doesn't hold to all of those beliefs (e.g., it doesn't know of any French students).
Thus while the system's assertion "No French students failed CSEI21 last term" is true, it has misled the user (1) inlo believing it concurs with the user's beliefs and (2) into drawing additional false conclusions from its response. 3 The differences between this related work and the current enterprise are that:
1. It is no_~t assumed in the current enterprise that there is any overt indication that the domain beliefs of the user are in any way at odds with those of the system. 2. In our related work, the user draws a false conclusion from what is said because the presuppositions of the response are not in accord with the system's beliefs {following a nice analysis in [lO] ).
In the current enterpri.~e, the us~,r draws a false conclusion from what is said because the system's response behavior is not in accord with the user's expectations. It. may or may not also 31t is a feature of that it point~ out the discrepancy by saying "| don't know of any French students ° involve false domain beliefs that the system attributes to the user.
In this paper, we describe two kinds of false conclusions we are attempting to block by modifying otherwise true response:
• false conclusions drawn by standard default reasoning -i.e., by the user/listener concluding (incorrectly) that there is nothing special about this case
• false conclusions drawn in a task-oriented context on the basis of the user's expectations about the way a cooperative expert will respond.
In Section II, we discuss examples of the first type, where the respondent (R) can reason that the questioner {Q) may inappropriately apply a default rule to the (true) information conveyed in R's response and hence draw a false conclusion. We characterize appropriate information for R to include in his response to block it. In Section HI, we describe examples of the second type. Finally, in Section IV, we discuss our claim regarding the primary constraint posed here on limiting R's responsibilities with respect to anticipating false conclusions that Q may draw from its response: that is, it is only that part of R's knowledge base that is already in focus (given the interaction up to that point, including R's formulating a direct answer to Q's query) that will be involved in anticipating the conclusions that Q may draw from R's response.
H Blocking Potential Misapplication of Default

Rules
Default reasoning is usually studied in the context of a logical system in its own right or an agent who reasons about the world from partial information and hence may draw conclusions unsupported by traditional logic. However, one can also look at it in the context of interacting agents. An agent's reasoning depends not only on his perceptions of the world but also on the information he receives in interacting with other agents. This information is partial, in that another agent neither will nor can make everything explicit. Knowing this, the first agent (Q) will seek to derive information implicit in the interaction, in part by contrasting what the other agent (R) has made explicit with what Q assumes would have been made explicit, were something else the case. Because of this, R must be careful to forestall inappropriate derivations that Q might draw. The question is on what basis R should rea.~on that Q may ~sume some piece of infotmati(>n (P) would have been made explicit in the interaction, were it the ease.
One basis, we contend, is the likelihood that Q will apply some staudard default rule of the type discussed by Reiter [15] if R doesn't make it explicite that the rule is not applicable. Reiter introduced the idea of default rules in the stand-alone context of an agent or logical system filling in its own partial information. Most standard default rules embody the sense that "given no reason to suspect otherwise, there's nothing special about the current case'. For example, for a bird what would be special is that it can't fly -i.e., •Most birds fly•. Knowing only that Tweety is a bird and no reason to suspect otherwise, an agent may conclude by default that there's nothing special about Tweety and so he can fly.
This kind of default reasoning can lead to false conclusions in a stand-along situation, but also in an interaction. That is, in a question-answer interaction, if the respondent (l{) has reason for knowing or suspecting that the situation goes counter to the standard default, it seems to be common practice to convey this information to the questioner (Q), to block his pote, tially a.ssuming the default. To see this, consider the following two examples. (The first is very much like the "Tweety" case above, while the second seems more general.) A. Example 1 Suppose it's the case that most associate professors are tenured and most of them have Ph.Ds. Consider the following interchange Q: Is Sam an ~sociate professor? R: Yes, but he doesn't have tenure. There are two thi, gs to account for here: (1) Given the information w&s not requested, why did R include the "but" clause, and (2) why this clause and not another one? We claim that the answer to the second question has to do with that part of R's knowledge base that is currently in focus. This we discuss more in Section IV. In the meantime, we will just refer to this subset as Hence, R will modify that planned response to block this false inference, as in the response above.
In general, we can represent R's reasoning about Q's reaction to a simple direct response •Yes, B(a)', given Q believes "Most Bs F=, in terms of the following default schema, using the notation introduced in [15 I. told{ILQ, l~(c) 
. 
F(c)
As in Reiter's discussion, "M(P)" means it is consistent to assume that P. In the associate professor example, B corresponds to the predicate "is an associate professor', F, to the predicate "has tenure', and c, to Sam. Using such an inslantiated rule schema, R will recognize that Q is likely to conclude F(c) -"Sam has tenure" -which. is false with rvspe(.t to RBc {and hence, with respect to all of R's knowledge base). Thus R will modify his direct response so as to block this false conclusion.
B. Example 2
Consider a user one of the mail systems on the DEC-20. To exit from this system, a user who has finished reading all the messages he earlier specified can just type a carriage return. To exit under other circumstances, the user must type QUIT. Consider the following interchange between a new user who has finished reading all his messages and either a mail system expert or the mail system itself.
Q: How (In I get out of mail? R~ Since you h:tve read all your specified messages, you can just type a carriage return. In all cases, you (':ill got ()lit by typing QHT. Here tile prohh,m is to account for all that part of R's response beyond the simple truthful statement "You can type a carriage return."
A general statement of this probh,m is a.s follows: Agent Q is in one situation (Sl) and wants to be in another ($2). There is a general procedure P for achieving $2 from any of several situations including Sl. There is a special prodecure P* (i.e., shorter, faster, simpler, etc.) for achieving $2 frolu Sl. Q doesn't know how to achieve $2, but R does (including proced,res P and P*). Q asks R how to achieve $2.
If R knows.i~lat Q is in situation SI and truthfully responds to Q's request by simply telling him P*, Q may falsely conclude that P* is a general procedure for achieving $2. That is, as in the Tweety and Sam examples, if Q has no reason to suspect anything special about SI (such that P* only applies to it), then there is nothing special about it. Therefore P* is adequate for achieving $2, whatever situation Q is in. 4 Later when Q tries to apply P* in a different situation to achieve $2, he may find that it doesn't work. As a particular examl)le of this, consider the mail case again. In this ca.se~ SI = Q has read all his messages $2 = Q is out of the mail system P ~---typing QUIT P* --typing a carriage return ~Lssume RBc contains at least the following informa.tion:
(e) Sl6r (f) simpler(P*,P) (g) VsE,~. "-{s = SI) =* -~(P*ls) = $21 where 17 is some set of states which includes SI and P(s) indicates action P applied to state S.
Based on RBc, R's direct response would be "You can exit the mail system by typing carriage return'. (It is &ssumed that an expert will always respond with the "best" procedure according to some metric, unle..~ he explicitly indicates otherwise -of. Section lIl, case 2}. However, this could lead Q to conclude falsely,-by default, something along tile lines of Vs . P*(s) ----$2. 5 Thus R will modify his planned response to call attention to SI {in particular, how to recognize it) and the limited applicability of P* to SI alone. The other modification to R's response ('In all cages, you can get out by typing QUIT'), we would ascribe simply to R's adhering to Grice's Alaxim of Quantity -"Make your contribution ,~s informative as is required for tile current purposes of tile exchange" given R's assumption of what is required of him in his role as expert/teacher.
HI Blocking False Conclusions in Expert
Interactions Tile situations we are concerned with here are ones in which the system is explicitly tasked with providing help and expertise to the user. In such circumstances, the user has a strong expectation that the system has both the experience and motivation to provide the most appropriate help towards achieving the user's goals. The Further studies [11, 12, 13] show that Q may also expect that R will respond in terms of a better plan if the recognized one is either sub-optimal or unsuitable for attaining Q's perceived goal. Thus because of this principle of "expert cooperative behavior', Q may expect a response to a more general question than the one he has actually asked. That is, in asking an expert • flow do 1 do X?" or "Can I do X?', Q is anticipating a response to "How can I achieve my goal?" 4Moreover if Q (falsely) believes that R doesn't know Q is in SI, Q will certainly assume that P* is a general procedure. However, this isn't necessary to the default reasoning behavior we are investigating. 5Clearly , this is only for some subset of states, ones corresponding to being in the mail system. Con',id,.r a slud,.ut ((,~) :+skhig th,' foll,+,+i.g que+thm, near the end of the term. Q'. Can I dr~q, C1~,-,77? Since it is already too late to drop a course, ti~e o~.!y dire,'t answer the ,x~*~rt (R) can give is "No'. Of course, part of :,:, expert's knowledge concerns the typical states users get into and the possible actions that permit transitions between them. Moreover it is al~o part of this expertise to infer such states from the current state of the inlrerac(.ion, Q's query, some shared knowledge of Q's goals and Pxpectali,ns and the shared assmnption that an expert is expected to attend to these higher goals. How the system should go about in"erring these states is a difficult task that others are exami,iug [2, 12, 13] . We assume that such an inference has been made. We al,~o assume for simplicity that the states are uniquely det.ermined. For example, we assume that the system has inferred that Q i.,: in state Sb (student is doing badly in the course} and wants to be in a state Sg {student is in a position to do better in this course or another one later), and that the a~tion a (diopping the course) will take him f:om Sb to Sg.
Given this, the response in (2) may lead Q to draw some conclusiuns that I/. knows to be false. For example, R can reason that since a principle of cooperative behavior for an expert is to tell Q the best way to go from Sb to Sg, Q is likely to conclude from R's response that there is no way to go from Sb to Sg. This con+:lusion however would be false if R knows some other ways of going from Sb to Sg. To avoid potenlially misleading Q, R must provide additional information, such as R: No, bul you can take an incomplete and ask for more time to finish the work.
As we noted earlier, an important question is how much reasoning R should do to block fals~ conclusions on Q's part. Again. we assume that R should only concern itself with those false conclusions that Q is likely to draw that involve that part of R's knowledge base currently in focus (RBc}, including of course that subset it nc~ds in order to answer the query in the first place.
We will make this a little more precise by considering several cases corresponding to the different states of R's knowledge base with r~peet to Sb, Sg. and tran~iti,m~ between them. For convenie,,.e, ~,: ~ill give an appropriate re~p~mse in terms of Sb, Sg and the actions.
Clearly, it should be given in terms of descriptions of ~lat,.s and actions understandable to Q. (Moreover, by making further assumptions about Q's beliefs, R may be able to validly trim some of its respond.) 1. Suppose that it is possible to go from Sb to Sg by dropping the course aml that. this is the only action that will take one from Sb to Sg.
Sb Sg
In this ca.se, the respon~ is R: Yes. ct is t h~ only action that will take you fr,,m Sb to St. 2. Suppose that in addition to going from Sb to Sg by dropping the cour~,~o there is a better way, say ~, of doing so.e
• .j Sb :
Sg
In this ca~e, the response is 6"Betteruess" is yet another urea for future research.
H: Yes, but there is a better action ,9 that will take you from Sb to Sg. 3. Suppose that dropping the course does not take you from Sb to St, but another action ~ will. This is the situation we considered in our earlier discussion.
Sb Sg
In this case the response is H: No, but there is an action ~ that will take you from Sb to St. 4. Suppose that there is no action that will take one from Sb to Sg.
Sb
Sg , /
In this the rcspon~ is R: No. There is no action that will take you from Sb to Sg.
Of course, other situations are possible. The point, however, is that the additional information that R provides to prevent Q from drawing fal~ conclusions is limited to just that part of R's knowledge hase that R is focussed on in answering Q's query.
IV
Constraining the Renpondent's Obligations As many people have observed -from studies across a range of linguistic phenomena, including co-referring expressions [3, 4, 16] , left dislocations [14] , epitomizatkm [17] , etc. -a speaker (R) normally focuses on n particular part of its knowledge base. What he focuses on dcpends in part oil (1) eoutext, (2} R's partial knf~wledge of Q's overall goals, as well as what Q knows already as a result of the interaction up to that point, and (3} Q's particular query, etc. The precise nature of how these various factors affect focusing is complex and is receiving much attention [3, 4, 16] . However, no matter how these various factors contribute to focusing, we can certainly assume that H comes to focus on a subset of its knowledge base in order to provide a direr answer to Q's query (at some level of inl,.rpretalion). Let us call this subset RBc for "R's current belief.~ ~. Our claim is tlmt one important constraint on cooperative behavior is that it is determined b.v RBc only. Clearly the i;ib~rmal.ion needed for a direct response is contained in RBc, a.~ is the information needed for many types of helpful responses.
In other words, RBc --that part of R's knowledge base that R deeide~ to focus on in order to glve-a direct. response to Q's quer~ -also has the information needed to generate several classes of h~Ipful responses. The simplest ease is presupposition failure [7] , as in (he following Q: llow many A's were given in (',IS 500 ? where Q presumes that CIS 500 was offered.
In trying to formulate a direct response, R will have to ascertain that CIS 500 was offered. If it was (Q's presumption is true}, then R can go ahead and give a direct response. If not, then R can indicate that CIS 500 was not offered and thereby avoid misleading Q. All of this is straightforward. The point here is that the information needed to provide this extra response is already there in that part of R's knowledge base which R had to look up anyway in order to try to give the direct, response.
In the above example, it is clear how the response can be localized to RP, c. We would like to claim that this approach has a wider applicability: that RBc alone is the basis for responses that anticipate and attempt to block interactional defaults as well. Since RBc contains the information for a direct response, R can plan one (r}. From r, R can reason whether it is possible for Q to infer some conclusion (g) which R knows to be false because -~g is in RBe. If so, then R should modify r so as to eliminate this possibility. The point is that the only false inferences that R will attempt to block are those whose falsity can be checked in RBc.
There may be other false inferences that Q may draw, whose falsity cannot be deterntined solely with respect to RBc (although it might be possible with respect to R's entire knowledge base). While intuitively this may not seen enough of a constraint on the amount of anticipatory reasoning that Joshi's revised maxim imposes on R, it does constrain things a lot by only considering a (relatively small) subset of knowledge base. Factors such as context may further delimit S's responses, but they will all be relative to RBc.
V
Conclusion
There are many gaps in the current work and several aspects not discussed here. In particular, 1. We are developing a formMism for accommodating the system's reasoning based on a type of HOLDS predicate whose two arguments are a proposition and a state; see [6] . 2. We are working on more examples, especially more problematic cases in which, for example, a direct answer to Q's query would be myes m [or the requested procedure} BUT a response to Q's higher goals would be "no t or "no" plus a warning -e.g., Q: Can I buy a 50K savings bond? S: Yes, but you could get the same security on other investments with higher returns. 3. We need to be more precise in specifying RBc, if we are to assume that all the information needed to account for R's cooperative behevior is contained there. This may in turn reflect on how the user's knowledge base must be structured. 4. We need to be more precise in specifying how default rules play a role in causing R to modify his direct response, in recognition of Q's likelihood of drawing what seems like a generalized "script" default -if there is no reason to assume that there is anything special about the current case, don't.
